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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
HUMAN LIFE BILL
In 1973, in the companion cases of Roe v. WadeI and Doe v. Bolton,2
the Supreme Court held that, under the fourteenth amendment, a wo-
man has a privacy right "to terminate her pregnancy ' 3 absent the
showing of a compelling state interest.4 The Court further found that
the unborn are not "persons" under the fourteenth amendment5 and
therefore cannot claim the rights to life, liberty or property as protected
therein.6 In excluding the unborn from the classification of "persons,"
the Court, ironically, never answered the fundamental question of
when life begins.7 The Court argued that in light of man's limited
knowledge such a determination would be mere judicial speculation.8
Criticized by many legal scholars,9 Roe has been the subject of nu-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
4. Id. at 154.
5. Id. at 157-58. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that no state shall
"deprive am,perron of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
Xiv, § I (emphasis added). The amendment's enforcement clause further provides: "The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. at
§ 5.
6. The Court never recognized the fetus as having any rights per se, presumably because the
Court found that the word "person" as used in the fourteenth amendment was not intended to
include the unborn. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). The state did, nevertheless, have an
important interest in safeguarding the "potential life" of the fetus once the fetus had the capability
of "meaningful life." Id. at 163. The importance of this interest, however, was qualified by the
health of the mother, with consideration given to her age and "physical, emotional, and psycho-
logical. . . well being". Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
8. Noting the "wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question," id.
at 160, the Court reasoned that "the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowl-
edge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id. at 159. The Court did not say that
Congress could not speculate, nor did it say that the determination of when life begins would
always be beyond man's knowledge.
9. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-29 (1975) (expressing "astonish-
ment" that only two dissents were filed in Roe and noting that the Court simply asserted "the
result it reached," thus breaking the discipline to which its function is properly subject); A. Cox,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976) (criticizing the
Court for failing to "establish the legitimacy of the decision by not articulating a precept ... to
lift the ruling above the level of political judgment," a precept the author admittedly could not
articulate himself); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf .4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 949 (1973) (noting that there is nothing in the Constitution creating a special freedom for
abortion and thus the "Court had no business imposing it"); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by
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merous commentaries and debates, as well as state' ° and federal legis-
lation." This Note will address the latter response and will focus
specifically on a recent legislative development-the Human Life
Bill. 12
The decision in Roe failed to answer two important questions. The
Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 185 (concluding that state an-
tiabortion statutes should not be struck down as unconstitutional "particularly in an opinion that
avoids. . . the hard questions that must be faced to reach that result."). See also B. NATHANSON,
ABORTING AMERICA (1979) (cofounder of what is now the Abortion Rights Action League se-
verely criticizing the taking of unborn life since Roe v. Wade).
10. Massachusetts, for example, passed an act which required mothers 18 years old and
younger to receive parental consent before procuring an abortion. This statute was found uncon-
stitutional in Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622 (1979). Missouri enacted a bill defining viability as
the stage at which life could be continued by natural or artificial means. This statute also was
found unconstitutional by the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
11. For example, since 1976 Congress has acted to limit federal funding of those abortions
not endangering the life of the mother or resulting from rape or incest not reported immediately to
public authorities. The rider provision enacting these limitations has become known as the Hyde
Amendment. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979) (sustained in Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 239 (1980)).
12. The bill is currently pending in the Congress. To date, it has only been reported out of
the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. This Note will focus on sections 1 and 2 of
this version of the bill. This bill is currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee and provides:
SECTION I. (a) The Congress finds that the life of each human being begins at con-
ception.
(b) The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States protects all human beings.
SEC. 2. Upon the basis of these findings, and in the exercise of the powers of Con-
gress, including its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, the Congress hereby recognizes that for the purpose of
enforcing the obligation of the States under the fourteenth amendment not to deprive
persons of life without due process of law, each human life exists from conception, with-
out regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency, and for this
purpose "person" includes all human beings.
SEC. 3. Congress further recognizes that each State has a compelling interest, in-
dependent of the status of unborn children under the fourteenth amendment, in protect-
ing the lives of those within the State's jurisdiction whom the State rationally regards as
human beings.
SEC. 4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior Federal court or-
dained and established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent
injunction, or declaratory judgment in any case involving or arising from any State law
or municipal ordinance that (1) protects the rights of human persons between conception
and birth, or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abortions or (b) the
provision at public expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or other assistance'for the per-
formance of abortions: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive the Supreme
Court of the United States of the authority to render appropriate relief in any case.
SEC. 5. Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from an
interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United States regard-
ing the enforcement of this Act, or of any State law or municipal ordinance that protects
the rights of human beings between conception and birth, or which adjudicates the con-
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Court determined neither the extent to which a woman might exercise
her right to privacy in choosing to abort her pregnancy1 3 nor the rela-
tionship between the existence of life and the attachment of "per-
sonhood" under the fourteenth amendment.'
4
To some extent, subsequent litigation has helped clarify the scope of
a woman's privacy right by indicating that a woman does not have an
absolute right to an abortion.' 5 As the Court emphasized in Maher v.
Roe,' 6 a woman's privacy right can only be understood in reference to
both the woman's interest and the nature of the state's obstruction of
stitutionality of this Act, or of any such law or ordinance. The Supreme Court shall
advance on its docket and expedite the disposition of any such appeal.
SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act
and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be
affected by such determination.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 97TH CONG., 1sT Sass., REPORT ON THE HUMAN
LIFE BILL 1-2 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL].
13. The Court in Roe did state, however, that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
was not absolute. A woman's right to abort during the first trimester is only conditional on her
finding a doctor who believes her pregnancy should be terminated. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
163 (1973). This condition only requires that a physician not act against his medical judgment or
conscience. During the second trimester the woman, depending on the state, may have to seek a
licensed facility. Id. After the fetus has reached viability, the woman must find a doctor who
believes it in her best interests to have an abortion. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
The time it takes for a child to reach viability may not be determined by state legislation, Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976), but is left to the discretion of the doctor. Id. at 64.
This potentialy may curtail the woman's right to abort as medical science brings viability closer to
conception. See Comment, Colautti v. Franklin. The Court Questions the Use of "Viability" in
Abortion Statutes, 6 W. ST. U.L. REv. 311, 323 (1979); 52 TEMP. L.Q. 1240, 1259 (1979).
14. Professor Wardle suggested that the Court decided this issue when it said we "need not
resolve this difficult question of when life begins." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). See
Wardle, .4 Brief Evaluation of The Constitutionality and Desirability of The Human L!fe Bill(s)
(1981), reprinted in The Human Life Bill Appendix: Hearings on S. 158 Before The Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of The Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 86-87 (1981)
(memorandum submitted by Professor Lynn D. Wardle). Wardle argued that the Court's decision
was whole and complete in itself, independent of the issue of when life begins. Professor Epstein,
however, noted that such a conclusion, if indeed it be a conclusion at all, is "clearly wrong if the
abortion question has. . . its own irreducible constitutional dimension." Epstein, supra note 9, at
182. To say that some human beings may be nonpersons under the law would seem an extreme
view to impute to any court.
15. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 239 (1980) (upholding congressional restrictions on feder-
ally funded abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (upholding a public hospital's decision
not to perform nontherapeutic abortion even though it handled pregnancies); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a congressional act severely restricting federally funded abortions);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (interpreting the federal Social Security Act to allow a state to
choose to withhold funds for nontherapeutic abortions when the state funded pregnancies and
medically necessary abortions). See generally 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 247 (1981).
16. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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it.'7 While a state may not impose criminal sanctions for procuring an
abortion, 8 the Constitution imposes no obligation on the state to pro-
vide public funding for abortion. 9
Unlike the privacy issue, the Court has shed little light on the nexus
between "personhood" and the inception of life.20 Aware of this judi-
cial abeyance, Congress has taken the initiative3'
Congress has made several attempts to limit the effect of the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade. One result has been the abatement of feder-
ally funded abortions, with limited exceptions." = Nevertheless, the an-
nual number of abortions procured in the United States continues to
rise.23 To curtail the climbing number of abortions, Congress has also
considered a "human life federalism amendment." 24 This amendment
would vest Congress and the states with the concurrent power to deter-
mine a uniform standard for the regulation of abortion on a national
level.25 Many proponents of a constitutional amendment, however,
have recognized the extraordinary consensus and the lengthy ratifica-
tion effort involved in amending the Constitution.26 As an alternate
17. Id. at 473. The Court noted that there is a fundamental difference between direct state
interference with a constitutional right and state encouragement of an alternative activity compati-
ble with legislative policy. Id. at 475.
18. Id. at 472.
19. Id. at 469.
20. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 2-7 (noting that the issue of
when life begins has yet to be resolved by the Court).
21. Id.
22. See supra note 11.
23. In 1979, 1.2 million abortions were procured in the United States, an increase of 7% over
the number in 1978, and an increase of 14% over the number in 1977. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES/PUBLIC H.ALTH SERVICES, ANNUAL SUMMARY 1979 OF MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY IN U.S. 103 (1979).
24. This amendment is more commonly known as the Hatch Amendment. It provides: "A
right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several States have the
concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortions: Provided, That a law of a State which is more
restrictive than a law of Congress shall govern." S. J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNe.
REc. 510,198 (1981).
25. See supra note 24.
26. To date, Congress has approved only 33 of the more than 10,000 amendments it has
considered; only 26 have ever been ratified, including the Bill of Rights. See Wechsler, The Courts
Aind The Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1004 (1965). For an amendment to pass through
the Senate alone, 67 out of 100 members would have to approve its passage. U.S. CONST., art. V.
One political analyst notes that there are presently at least 43 senators who are opposed to a
constitutional amendment. Ward, Avoiding a Pro-Life Dunkirk in Congress, NEW LIFE 6 (Oct.
1981). He concludes that there is very little chance for an amendment's passage in the near future.
Id.
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measure, Congress may consider drawing upon its authority to enforce
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, described as "a vast un-
tapped reservoir of federal legislative power,"' 27 and adopt the Human
Life Bil.
28
The Bill is a direct congressional response to the Court's admitted
inability to resolve the threshold issue of when life begins.29 On the
basis of the Senate subcommittee hearings,3 ° the proposed Bill suggests
three findings:31 first, that the biological life of a human being
32
originates at conception;33 second, that regardless of the period of ges-
tation,34 every human life has intrinsic worth and is of equal value;
35
and third, for purposes of enforcing the fourteenth amendment, "per-
sonhood" extends to all human beings.36
A statute such as the Human Life Bill could have a profound influ-
ence on the Court's continued adherence to its rulings in Roe.37 The
remainder of this Note will evaluate the extent of congressional power
to enact the Human Life Bill despite the Supreme Court's rulings in
27. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term--Forward" ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Pro-
motion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 98-99 (1966).
28. See Galebach, .4 Human Life Statute, 7 HUMAN LIFE REV. 5, 5 (1981) (an amendment
affords the surest protection, but in the meantime Congress should act); Interview with Prof.
Charles E. Rice, reprinted in THE WANDERER 4 (July 23, 1981) (arguing that a Human Life Bill is
not inconsistent with an amendment and that should the Supreme Court declare it unconstitu-
tional strong support for the prompt enactment of a Human Life Amendment might emerge).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). Professor Uddo suggested that the Court's
failure to resolve the issue of when life begins not only precluded its recognition of the unborn as
persons but potentially diminished the scope of protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment
to those already born. The Human Life Bill- Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-53 (1981) (testimony
of Professor Basile J. Uddo) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 158].
30. Hearings on S. 158, mupra note 29.
31. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 3.
32. A human being, as referred to in the subcommittee report, means "a being that is alive
and is a member of the human species." Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 7-13.
34. "Gestation" is defined as "the time during which a woman carries a fetus in her womb,
from conception to birth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979).
35. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 13-18.
36. Id. at 20-29.
37. If the principles ofjudicial supremacy, the balance and separation of powers, and judicial
independence do not become the prevailing issues, see Wardle, supra note 14, at 86-87 (suggesting
passage of a bill making the simple finding that human life begins at conception to avoid the
judicial supremacy issue), the inadequacy of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe would become
obvious. The Court would be left to decide whether all human life is deserving of constitutional
protection, a decision the Court skirted in Roe.
Washington University Open Scholarship
224 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:219
Roe.38 This Note first examines the degree of authority the fourteenth
amendment vests in Congress to enforce its provisions.39 Second, it
analyzes a series of cases in which the Court has deferred to congres-
sional determinations involving the fourteenth amendment despite
prior conflicting judicial rulings.40 Third, the Note discusses two theo-
ries that attempt to explain the Court's submission to legislative find-
ings in these cases.4 1 Finally, the Note concludes that the Human Life
Bill is a valid exercise of the congressional enforcement power entitled
to judicial deference under either theory.42
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE
The source of congressional authority to enact the Human Life Bill is
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.43 This section confers on Con-
gress the power to enforce provisions of the amendment through "ap-
propriate legislation." 44 Section 1 declares that no state shall take the
life of any person without due process of law.45 Congressional adop-
tion of the Human Life Bill would support this directive.46
In the past the Court has recognized the expansive power vested in
Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment47 and has upheld legis-
lative initiatives arguably contrary to prior Court holdings.48 As early
as 1879, the Court noted that the strength of the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments derived from the congressional enforcement
power.49 The amendments specifically enlarged the power of Congress,
not the power of the judiciary.50 This conception of congressional en-
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). With respect to the Human Life Bill, two fundamental issues are
presented. First, does a Supreme Court ruling on a subject preclude a congressional determina-
tion to the contrary? Second, should the Court defer to opposing congressional conclusions?
39. See infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 66-118 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 132-61 & 188-202 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 162-87 & 204-07 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 5; REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at § 2.
44. See supra note 5.
45. Id.
46. The express purpose of the Human Life Bill is to ensure that all human life is protected.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 49-58 & 94-99 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 66-120 and accompanying text.
49. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879).
50. Id. The Court stated, "[ilt is not said thejudicialpower ... shall extend to enforcing the
prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed .... It is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged." Id. (emphasis added). Professor Franz has added:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/5
Number 1] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HUMAN LIFE BILL
forcement power has persisted through the years."
In two recent decisions, City of Rome v. United States 2 and Fullilove
v. Klutznick,53 the Court reiterated the broad scope of congressional
enforcement power. The Court equated it with the enforcement au-
thority under the necessary and proper clause,54 generally viewed as
one of the most expansive sources of power in the Constitution." The
Court determined that the legislation required to protect fourteenth
amendment rights generally lies within the discretion of Congress. 6
The Court's understanding of what legislation is appropriate in en-
forcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment has been equally
generous. Contemporary courts subject legislation to the rationality
standard formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land:7 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
[It is reasonable to infer that not only in the Congress, but in the ratifying legislatures
and amongst the voters who elected the ratifying legislatures, the fourteenth amendment
was widely thought of as something which would empower the Congress to deal effec-
tively with the situation depicted in the [congressional committee] testimony.
Furthermore, the framers and backers of the fourteenth amendment were primarily
interested in enlarging the powers of Congress, not those of the federal judiciary, which
was looked upon with considerable distrust.
Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE
L. REV. 1353, 1355-56 (1964).
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments' enforcement clauses empower Congress
to enforce the amendments by appropriate legislation. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend.
XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
51. See infra notes 52-56 & 92-99 and accompanying text.
52. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). See infra note 202.
53. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See infra note 202.
54. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980) (discussing enforcement power under
§ 5 of fourteenth amendment); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 174-75 (discussing
enforcement power under § 2 of fifteenth amendment). The necessary and proper clause provides
that Congress shall have powers "[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof." U.S. CONsT., art.
I, § 8, cl. 18.
55. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall de-
scribed the power conferred on Congress by the necessary and proper clause of article I: "1st, the
clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers. 2nd,
its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to
be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted." Id. at 419-20. See generally
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92-112 (10th ed. 1980); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227-31 (1978).
56. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980).
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. '5 "
Prior to Roe v. Wade, the congressional enforcement power would
have permitted the enactment of a "human life bill." Had Congress
sought to intercede on behalf of any individual whose life was jeopard-
ized by state action, it would have been necessary to determine whether
there was any existent life to protect, 59 and, if so, whether the life of
that individual deserved protection.6" Congressional action to prevent
the termination of protected life would have been "plainly adapted" to
the congressional duty to prevent the taking of any individual's life
without due process of law. 61
Notwithstanding the apparently wide latitude Congress has in
preventing the arbitrary taking of human life, the propriety of the
Human Life Bill may be questionable if it conflicts with the opinion of
the judiciary, a coequal branch of the government. This conffict arises
if the legislation both protects a class of individuals that the Court does
not consider to be within the protection of the Constitution62 and in-
fringes upon a judicially recognized fundamental right of a second
party.63 The Congress and the Court, however, have been in discord
before, and congressional power to legislate under the enforcement
clause has not appeared dependent upon which branch encountered the
issue first.' Indeed, the Court has exhibited an increasingly deferential
58. Id. at 421. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980). See also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980).
59. If there were no life, Congress would not have any justifiable interest in protecting the
entity under the fourteenth amendment. If Congress found that there was life to protect and
enacted legislation to do so, and if the action was challenged as beyond congressional power, the
Court would have to explore the facts underlying the issues. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
272 (1959) ("duty rests on [the] Court to decide for itself facts or constructions upon which federal
constitutional issues rest,") (quoting Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954)).
See also Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807,
813-14 (1973).
60. This value question can only be considered after an affirmative determination that there
is life present to value. See infra notes 208-31 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 5.
62. This was the obvious consequence of the Court's holding that "the word 'person,' as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158
(1973), coupled with its later statement that "lifthe State [were] interested in protecting fetal life,"
it could regulate abortions after viability. Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added). See REPORT ON THE
HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 2-7. Compare supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text with
REPORT ON THE HUMAN LiFE BILL, supra note 12, at §§ 1(b), 2.
63. See infra note 231.
64. See Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 603, 618-19 (1975). Because the Court has encountered particular issues prior to Congress
[Vol. 61:219
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approach to contrary congressional views.65
II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CONGRESSIONAL
ENFORCEMENT POWER
The cases that best demonstrate judicial submission to congressional
findings in conflict with prior judicial declarations primarily concern
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.66 Invoking its enforcement power, Con-
gress passed the Act and effectively disregarded two prior Court deci-
sions: the Civil Rights Cases67 and Lassiter v. Northampton Board of
Elections. 68
In the Civil Rights Cases,69 the Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of two provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act.70 These sec-
tions provided for the nondiscriminatory use of any facility, including
those privately held, that catered to the general public.71 In ruling that
Congress had acted beyond the scope of its enforcement power under
both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 72 the Court estab-
lished the principle that Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement
power is limited to enjoining those actions adjudged unconstitutional
by the Court.73
In Lassiter v. Northhampton Board of Elections74 the Supreme Court
upheld North Carolina's voting registration requirement that a voter
having an opportunity to do so has not affected the Court's serious consideration of congressional
conclusions contrary to those of the Court. See infra notes 66-118 and accompanying text.
65. The Court has recognized the authority and unique ability of Congress to aid the Court
in securing the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 79; Burt, Miranda and Title I" A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV.
81. See also infra notes 66-145 and accompanying text.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973(p) (1976).
67. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
68. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
69. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
70. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 335-36 (1875).
71. Section 2 specifically provided for the levying of fines on those who violated the act. Id.
at § 2.
72. The enforcement clauses of each amendment are identical. See supra note 5; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
73. 109 U.S. at 18-19. In holding these sections unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment, the Court noted that Congress' section 5 power extended only to enacting remedies
for "correcting the effects of... prohibited state laws and state Acts, and thus render them effec-
tually null, void and innocuous." Id. at 11. It remained the judiciary's task to decide what activi-
ties violated constitutional rights. See Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Access Rights, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1265 (1980).
74. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Washington University Open Scholarship
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:219
pass a literacy test.7 5 A unanimous Court, while recognizing the consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to suffrage, 76 held the right subject to non-
discriminatory state regulation.7 7 A neutral standard such as literacy 7s
was not, in and of itself, an invalid device for raising voting stan-
dards.79 Rather, only evidence indicating a clear discriminatory impact
could condemn such tests as an unconstitutional infringement upon the
right to vote. 0
Despite the judicial authorization in Lassiter to implement literacy
tests in a nondiscriminatory manner,8' and the pronouncement in the
Civil Rights Cases limiting Congress' fourteenth amendment enforce-
ment power to enjoining those actions adjudged unconstitutional by
the Court, 2 Congress passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 3 The Act
mandated both the suspension of literacy tests in any area where fewer
than fifty percent of the voting age residents were registered8 4 and the
enfranchisement of anyone of voting age who had successfully com-
pleted the sixth grade. 5
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 6 a case challenging section 4(e) of the
75. The registration requirement was challenged as a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. See supra note 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
76. 360 U.S. at 51.
77. Id.
78. The Court believed literacy to be "neutral on race, creed, color, and sex." Id.
79. Id. at 52-54.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973(p) (1976).
84. Sections 4(a)-(d) of the Act authorized the United States Attorney General to suspend all
literacy tests for five years if it was determined that such a device had been used and less than 50%
of its voting age residents were registered. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 4(a)-(d) (1976).
85. Section 4(e) prohibited the testing of literacy as a prerequisite to voter registration if the
potential registrant had successfully completed the sixth grade in an American school, regardless
of the language spoken at the school. The only state affected by the Act was New York, where
numerous Puerto Ricans who attended Spanish speaking schools were unable to register because
of failure to pass an English literacy test. Id. § 1973 4(e).
86. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the Court
first examined the constitutionality of the Act's "fifty percent" provision by specifically consider-
ing the scope of congressional enforcement power under the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 324-37.
The Court found Congress' fifteenth amendment enforcement power identical to that under the
fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying iext. Congress had compiled
evidence indicating the discriminatory application of literacy tests in many regions, thus fulfilling
the Lassiter discriminatory impact requirement. 383 U.S. at 308-09, 333-34. See supra notes 74-80
and accompanying text. In considering congressional authority to enact such legislation under the
enforcement clause, the Court applied the deferential rational relationship test employed under
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1965 Voting Rights Act, 7 the Court implied that Congress might delin-
eate the substantive scope of the Constitution independent of the judi-
ciary. Section 4(e) prohibited anyone who had successfully completed
the sixth grade in an American school from being disqualified from
voting on the basis of a literacy test.88  Unlike previously disputed sec-
tions of the Act, 9 which were upheld on the basis of an imposing
wealth of evidence,' the Court in Morgan produced no factual data
the necessary and proper clause. 383 U.S. at 326. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
The Court, however, in holding the 50% formula rational and appropriate, 383 U.S. at 326-27,
approved a congressional inference that such a discriminatory use was likely in areas where no
evidence had been prepared. The state has the burden to prove that there was no voting discrimi-
nation in those areas. Id. at 330. The Court emphasized the remedial nature of the legislative
decision to protect the right to vote, id. at 326-30, a policy choice clearly within the power of the
legislature. See L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 265. Nevertheless, the Court's recognition of congres-
sional authority to proscribe state practices that were only likely to infringe upon constitutional
rights, without any absolute proof, represented a departure from its holding in Lassiter.
Although South Carolina v. Katzenbach was not constitutionally significant because it focused
on remedial congressional action, the Court's broad language in discussing the enforcement power
raised the question of the extent to which Congress might alter prior judicial holdings concerning
more substantive matters. See Killian, A Federal Statutory Protectionfor Privacy Rights, in CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICES 53-54 (July 11, 1978). One authority has commented that "[the intent was
obviously to rationalize the holding to precedents in which remedial legislation found appropriate
had been sustained. But a reading of the Act and of South Carolina v. Katzenbach indicates that
the Act did go further than earlier civil rights law and cannot be deemed merely 'remedial."'
Killian, supra, at 53-54.
The Court rejected South Carolina's contention that Congress was limited to forbidding
fifteenth amendment violations using general terms, and its claim that the task of applying specific
remedies to particular localities was the job of the courts. 383 U.S. at 327. But see Freud, Review
of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 47, 48 (E. Cahn ed. 1954)
(if legislation is particularized it approaches judicial arena). Although the Act was admittedly an
"inventive" exercise of Congress' enforcement power, 383 U.S. at 327, the Court refused to "cir-
cumscribe [Congress] by such artificial rules." Id. Declaring that "[tihe basic test to be applied in
a case involving section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment [was] the same as in all cases concerning
the express powers of Congress ... " id. at 326, the Court cited Chief Justice Marshall's rational
relationship test, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text, as the applicable standard. 383
U.S. at 326.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 4(e) (1976). Congressional reliance on its enforcement power under the
fourteenth amendment was clearly indicated in the preamble to section 4(e):
Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of
persons educated in American flag schools in which the predominant classroom lan-
guage was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the
right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter
in the English language.
Id.
88. See supra note 85.
89. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); supra note 86.
90. See supra note 86.
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whatsoever to support Congress' action.91
Despite its previous ruling in Lassiter that at least some evidence of a
discriminatory impact must be established to prohibit literacy tests,
92
the Morgan Court refused to find section 4(e) of the Act unconstitu-
tional.93  The Court's rationale emphasized the congressional obliga-
tion to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment
independently from the judiciary.94 Whether or not the Court would
have found the state's literacy requirement in violation of the Constitu-
tion was irrelevant.95 The sole issue before the Court was whether
Congress had acted within the limits of the amendment's enforcement
clause.96 To this end, Congress had only to meet the lenient rationality
standard applied under the necessary and proper clause.97 The balanc-
ing of the state's interest in maintaining certain voting standards, the
availability of alternative remedies, and the risk of discrimination were
all within the ambit of congressional authority.98 Congress' resolution
of the voting issue, therefore, was not subject to judicial circumvention
because the resulting legislation was "plainly adapted" to the amend-
ment's enforcement. 99
91. Section 4(e) was introduced as a floor amendment and was limited to a one-hour debate
on the Senate floor. 111 CONG. REC. 11,027-28, 11,060-74, 28,368 (1965). There were no hearings
held.
92. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
93. 384 U.S. at 648, 658. The Attorney General of New York argued that Congress could
only act if the judiciary decided that the application of the literacy tests were violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 648. The Court firmly rejected this idea as too confining. Id. See
mfira note 95.
94. 384 U.S. at 648. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
95. See 384 U.S. at 649. The Court's holding was a marked departure from previous deci-
sions that limited Congress to prohibiting only those practices declared unconstitutional by the
Court. See Civil Rights Cases, 100 U.S. 3, 18 (1883); supra note 73 and accompanying text. The
Morgan Court refused to confine Congress "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional." 384 U.S. at 649. The
Court thought it necessary to allow Congress to legislate without the need for "a judicial determi-
nation that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the [Constitution]."
Id. at 648.
96. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, framed the issue as follows: "Without regard to
whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause [had been violated], could
Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?" 384 U.S. at 649.
97. Id. at 651. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); supra notes 57-
58 and accompanying text & note 86.
98. 384 U.S. at 653.
99. Id. Commentators have attempted to explain Congress' enforcement power under the
fourteenth amendment. Professor Burt, for example, has described Congress' power as "filling in
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In Oregon v. Mitchell, 1° the Court clearly departed from the Lassiter
decision.101 The case focused on a series of amendments to the 1965
Voting Rights Act,'"2 and the Court again confronted the issue of con-
gressional power under the enforcement clause.'0 3 This time a unani-
mous Court, including Justices Harlan and Stewart, t°4 who had refused
to sustain similar legislation in Morgan t°5 upheld the congressional
power to suspend the use of all literacy tests nationwide."°6 All of the
justices were convinced that the substantial evidence before Congress
provided a sufficient basis from which Congress could rationally con-
clude that literacy tests lent themselves to discriminatory application.0 7
the blanks" when the Court has set the basic standards. See Burt, supra note 65, at 115. Similarly,
Professor Monaghan has suggested that Congress may "fine tune" those judicial holdings that the
Court, limited to considering the particular facts of the case at hand, is unable to do. See
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term--Forward" Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 28-29 (1975). Professor Sager believes Congress may legislate only when judicial re-
straints have prevented the Court from expanding the constitutional norms enunciated by the
Court. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1239-42 (1978). Professor Cohen takes a more limited view, restricting con-
gressional action to those areas in which a state legislature would be competent to act. In those
cases, he argues that deference should be paid to congressional judgment due to its superior com-
petence in balancing national and state interests. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 614. See generally
Note, supra note 73, at 1273 n.49 (1980).
100. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
101. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See generally supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
102. The Court considered the constitutionality of Titles II and III of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). Title II placed an absolute ban on
the use of literacy tests as a device for securing the right to vote. Id. at 315. Title III proposed to
reduce the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age for both federal and state elections. Id. at 318.
103. See 400 U.S. at 126-30.
104. Id. at 152 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 281 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. 384 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The legislation was similar insofar as both
banned the use of literacy tests; section 4(e) prohibited their use where the applicant had passed
the sixth grade, see supra note 85, and Title II prohibited their use altogether. See supra note 102.
106. 400 U.S. at 152, 216-18 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 281,
282-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both justices were convinced that
"[diespite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application," id. at 216, there
was sufficient proof, id. at 216 n.16, 283, for Congress to rationally conclude that literacy tests lent
themselves to discriminatory application. Id. at 217, 283.
In light of this more deferential analysis, it is arguable that the dissenting opinions of Harlan
and Stewart in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966), were ostensibly based on the lack
of factual support for Congress' actions. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 608. When factual data is
gathered demonstrating a danger of a constitutional violation, the Court will take a more deferen-
tial approach. See 400 U.S. at 216, 283-84; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659, 668 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
107. Although the Court split over Congress' power to reduce the voting age, it was unani-
mous in recognizing the congressional power to ban the use of literacy tests. 400 U.S. at 118
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This decision implied that the use of literacy tests was discriminatory
by nature, 08 an apparent retraction of the Court's holding in
Lassiter."°9 Thus, the principle established in the CivilRights Cases,it0
limiting congressional fourteenth amendment enforcement power to
remedying those practices found unconstitutional by the Court,tt was
finally abandoned.' 12
(Black, J., announcing the judgments of the Court in an opinion expressing his own view of the
case), 144-47 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 280 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), 231-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 281-84
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court's handling of Title III of the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970 was of less clear
significance. In what has been described as a "constitutional law disaster area," see Cohen, supra
note 64, at 139, the Mitchell Court approved the congressional power to reduce the voting age in
federal elections but rejected it in the case of state elections.
Five opinions were written, none of which commanded a majority of the Court's support. Jus-
tice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and White concurred, argued in favor of Title III's
validity as a whole. 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
nexus between age limits and the state interest in furthering intelligent and responsible voting, Id.
at 242, was a factual issue. Id. at 249. Congress, being better suited to handle complex factual
questions, id. at 248, is entitled to deference except when its findings are "'arbitrary,' 'irrational,'
or 'unreasonable.'" Id. From his opinion, it is not clear whether Justice Brennan would defer to
congressional determinations recognizing "fundamental rights" or "suspect classifications." See
id. at 247 n.30; Note, FederalPower to Regulate Pripate Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforce-
ment Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 508 (1974).
Justice Stewart, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred, argued that
Morgan's articulation of Congress' enforcement power was limited to imposing remedies which
"elaborated upon the direct command of the Constitution," 400 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), or in "overrid[ing] state laws [where] they were in fact used as
instruments of invidious discrimination .. " Id. This should not be construed to give Congress
the power to "determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within
the ambit" of the equal protection clause, id., and "what state interests are 'compelling.'" Id.
Justice Harlan, agreeing with Justice Stewart's conclusion, expressed the view that the four-
teenth amendment did not apply to voting rights. Id. at 200 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Furthermore, it was "fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional
structures," to give Congress a "final say on matters of constitutional interpretation." Id. at 205.
With Justice Douglas filing an opinion in support of the validity of Section III as a whole, id. at
135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Black cast the swing vote. Id.
at 117. Justice Black argued that Congress had the power to change the voting age in federal
elections, id. at 117-18, but that the states had the reserved power to establish voter qualification
standards for their own elections. Id. Congress could intervene only in those cases where there
was evidence of discrimination. Id. at 127-28.
108. Galebach, supra note 28, at 14.
109. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
110. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
111. See id. at 18; supra note 73 and accompanying text.
112. The original shift occurred in Morgan when the Court stated that it was unnecessary for
the Court to find the act unconstitutional. 384 U.S. at 648. See supra notes 94-95 and accompany-
ing text. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1966), Justice Black noted the wide range of factual
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/5
Number 1] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HUMAN LIFE BILL
The Court, shortly after Morgan, again limited the Civil Rights Cases
by abandoning the doctrine that prohibited Congress from proscribing
private actions affecting fourteenth amendment rights and privileges." 3
In United States v. Guest," 4 the defendants challenged the congres-
sional enforcement power to prohibit private conspiracies that did not
reflect state involvement. 1 5 Under the statute, no state involvement
was required for prosecution. 16 In upholding the statute, six concur-
ring justices" t7 supported the extension of congressional enforcement
power beyond the holding of the Civil Rights Cases."I
data upon which Congress could rely in order to conclude that literacy tests were being used
discriminatorily, id. at 132-34. Evidence of specific tests being used discriminatorily in Arizona or
Idaho, two parties challenging Title II, was not cited by the Court. This arguably foreclosed the
Court's finding, on its own, that these states' use of the test was unconstitutional. See supra notes
75-80 and accompanying text.
113. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Courts had consistently held that the fourteenth amendment did
not reach private action. Id. at 12-13. Based on these prior decisions, the Court found that sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited private discrimination, exceeded
the congressional enforcement power. Id. at 11.
114. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). The statute provided in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise. . . of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. . . . [t]hey shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years or both.
Id.
116. See supra note 115.
117. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart found a peripheral participation by the State in a
conspiracy to arrest blacks by means of falsified criminal reports. 383 U.S. at 755-56.
Justice Clark, writing for himself and Justices Black and Fortas, believed that section 5 empow-
ered Congress to punish all conspiracies regardless of state involvement. Id. at 761, 762 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, argued that
any conspiracies interfering with fourteenth amendment rights were within Congress' power to
proscribe. Id. at 774, 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Justice Brennan stated that limiting the congressional enforcement power to remedying
unconstitutional state action would "[reduce] the legislative power to enforce the provisions of the
Amendment to that of the judiciary. . . and . . . [attribute] a far too limited objective to the
Amendment's sponsors." Id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (foot-
notes omitted). Justice'Brennan went on to recall Chief Justice Marshall's formulation in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), of the rationality standard now applied to
Congress' enforcement power. 383 U.S. at 783-84. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Professor Cox expressed support for this interpretation of Congress' fourteenth amendment
power. See Cox, supra note 27, at 117. See also Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutioal
Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 242 (1971) (common sense and analogies in the legal
system give ample grounds for concluding Congress need not distinguish between state and pri-
vate action) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Determinations]. But see Note, Fourteenth Amend-
ment Congressional Power to Legislate Against Private Discriminations: The Guest Case, 52
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III. WILL MORGAN ALLOW CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSION OF
"PERSONHOOD" TO THE UNBORN?: THE DEFERENTIAL
AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
In Roe v. Wade,"' the Court decided that, for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment, the unborn at any stage of development were not
"persons" deserving of the law's protection. 20 In reaching its decision,
the Court made two significant observations. First, if the fetus' "per-
sonhood" under the fourteenth amendment were established, the wo-
man's case would collapse, for the amendment would then specifically
guarantee the fetus' right to life.' Second, because man's knowledge
had not developed to the degree that a consensus could be reached as to
when life begins,'22 the Court was in no position to provide an an-
swer. 2 Without resolving the fundamental question of when life be-
gins, 2 4 the Court understandably was unable to include the unborn in
the amendment's protected classification of "person." In the Court's
view, 121 a fetus is merely a "theory of life" which, at viability, turns into
a "potential of life."'1 26 Exercising its enforcement power, 27 Congress
CORNELL L. Q. 586, 589 (1967) (fourteenth amendment directed only at state action); Comment,
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Problems in the Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U.L.
REv. 599, 613 (1972) (state involvement required to implicate fourteenth amendment rights).
119. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. Id. at 157-58.
121. Id. at 156-57.
122. Id. at 159. The Court did not preclude the possibility of man's acquiring the knowledge.
See supra note 8.
The suggestion that a consensus is needed, or even relevant, for the existence of a right seems
repugnant to the concept of a constitution. Indeed the Court itself has said, "[olne's right to life
... may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections." West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
123. 410 U.S. at 159. The Court only disqualified itself, not Congress. See supra note 8.
124. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 4; Galebach, supra note 28, at 6.
See Byrn, supra note 59, at 813-14. But see Wardle, supra note 14.
125. The jurisprudential problems with the Court's treatment of when life begins raises many
questions about how far the Court can go in defining what is and what is not protected by the
Constitution. See J. NOONAN, A PRIvATE CHOICE 13-19 (1979).
126. The Court has forbidden states from adopting "one theory of life...." 410 U.S. at 162.
Professor Epstein asked whether there is anything prior to viability but potential life. Epstein,
supra note 11, at 182. Representative Hyde suggested that there is no such thing as a '"otentlally"
living organism. It is either living or it is not, but "[i]f it is alive, it is what its nature is, even
though it is incomplete in its functional development." It may possess "great potentiality but is
not itself potential life." Thus, an individual whose potential has yet to reach complete fruition "is
no less a person because its functions are, as yet, undeveloped. . . ." Hyde, The Human Lie Bill:
Some Issues andAnswers, 8 HUMAN LIFE REv. 6, 12-13 (1982) (emphasis in original). See gener-
ally R. JoYcE, NEw PERSPECTrVES ON ABORTION (1981).
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is considering the Human Life Bill'2 8 as a legislative response to the
Court's refusal to resolve the issue of when life begins and its relation-
ship to "personhood" under the fourteenth amendment.
29
The extent of congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause and to pass the Human Life Bill hinges, in
large part, upon how Katzenbach v. Morgan 130 is construed. Commen-
tators, along with various members of the Court, have posited a
number of theories explaining Congress' role in enforcing the four-
teenth amendment.' 31 The remainder of this Note will focus primarily
on two of these theories, with specific reference to Congress' authority
to enact the Human Life Bill.
A. The Deferential Approach
The more expansive theory extrapolated from Morgan confers on
Congress a plenary grant of legislative authority. 32 Congress is free to
create statutory rights and privileges provided they reflect the substan-
tive values of the fourteenth amendment.13 3  Neither prior judicial
holdings134 nor the absence of factual evidence' 35 will necessarily pres-
ent an insuperable barrier to legislative protection of fourteenth
amendment liberties. 136  Otherwise, Congress would merely remedy
practices adjudged unconstitutional by the judiciary. 137 The Court's
standard of review is governed by the "appropriateness" of the legisla-
127. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 20-29 (the committee specifically
cites what it perceives to be Congress' enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment).
128. See supra note 12.
129. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 2-7. See supra notes 121-24 and
accompanying text.
130. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See generally supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 99.
132. This interpretation of the majority opinion in Morgan was first declared by Justice
Harlan in his dissent. 384 U.S. at 668. In response to the majority's holding that Congress could
restrict the use of literacy tests without a showing of discriminatory use, id. at 667-68, see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text, Justice Harlan argued that Congress had been given, in effect,
"the power to define the substantive scope of the [fourteenth] [a]mendment." Id. at 668. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 55, at 267; Sager, upra note 99, at 1237.
133. Sager, supra note 99, at 1237. Professor Sager argued, however, that such a reading of
Morgan goes too far. Congress should be properly limited to assisting the Court in fashioning the
"contours of elusive constitutional principles like due process and equal protection." Id. at 1238.
134. See supra notes 69-118 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
137. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966). The framers, in fact, intended to
enlarge Congress' power through the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 50.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
236 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:219
tion.' 38 The Court will not declare the act unconstitutional if the legis-
lation reflects a plausible reading of the Constitution.1 39
This more limited notion of judicial review 40 was expressed by Al-
exander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78.141 In his review of a tripartite
form of government, 142 Hamilton characterized the judiciary in rela-
tion to the executive and legislative branches, as the most impotent
branch, possessing "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment."' 143
A pivotal attribute of the Court's limited, independent form of re-
view,144 however, is its willingness to declare unconstitutional only that
which is inimical to the "manifest tenor of the Constitution;"'145 other-
138. 384 U.S. at 649-50.
139. The issue for the Court becomes whether it can perceive a plausible constitutional basis
"upon which Congress might predicate a judgment." Id. at 656. See Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1933): "The guarantee of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id. at 525; L. TRINE, supra note
55, at 271-72; Note, supra note 73, at 1273-74, 1276-77.
Professor Cox, although not strictly advocating a completely deferential Court, observed that
judicial review is countermajoritarian: a small body of men, appointed for life, is em-
powered to set aside the will of the elected representatives of the people. This may not
be objectionable when the Court is giving effect to a fairly absolute, enduring command
rooted either in the words of the Constitution or in years of constitutional tradition. It is
objectionable where the Court is simply second-guessing the legislature....
Constitutional Determinations, supra note 118, at 210.
140. See generally Wolfe,, Theory of U.S. ConstitutionalHistory, 43 J. POL. 292 (May, 1981).
141. THE FEDERAsLT No. 78, at 464 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
142. Hamilton noted that the executive dispenses honors and holds the sword; the legislature
not only controls the purse but also "prescribes rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated." Id. at 465. The Judiciary, on the other hand, "has no influence over
either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and
can take no active resolution whatever." Id.
143. Id.
144. Judicial review does not "suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."
Rather, "[it only supposes that the power of the people [as expressed in their constitution] is
superior to both." Id. at 467-68.
145. Id. at 466. James Bradley Thayer, in his analysis of judicial review, observed that the
early "rule of administration" involving the constitutionality of legislation did not void the legisla-
tion "unless the violation of the [C]onstitution [was] so manifest as to leave no room for reason-
able doubt." Thayer, The Origin And Scope of The American Doctrine Of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REv. 129, 140 (1893) (citation omitted). Thayer collects a number of early cases dealing
with judicial review, id. at 138-42, to support his conclusion that an act should not be found
unconstitutional unless it is "so clear that it is not open to rational question." Id. at 144. See, e.g.,
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 254 (1827) (Washington, J.,):
"[I]f I could rest my opinion in favour of the constitutionality of the law ... on no other
ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estimation, be
a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect due to the. . . legislative body,
by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the
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wise, there is no basis for making the judiciary a distinct body.'4 6
The Court's adherence to a rather narrow scope of review is evi-
denced by the infrequency with which congressional acts were declared
unconstitutional prior to the Civil War.' 47 Only in Marbury v.
Madison4 and Dred Scott 149 did the Court exercise its judicial "veto"
to defeat an act of Congress. Modem courts, however, have increas-
ingly invalidated congressional legislation.'5° As Judge Learned Hand
stated,' 5 ' the present concept of the judiciary regards the Court "as a
third legislative chamber." Amazingly, this "patent usurpation" of the
legislature's role has long remained unchallenged. 52
constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This has always been the language
of this Court, when that subject has called for its decision."
Id. at 270.
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 141, at 493. When the judiciary substitutes its will
for that of the legislature, its need for political independence is dissolved. Id.
147. See infra notes 148-49.
148. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Part of the Court's decision in Marbury dealt with an
obscure section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which attempted to enlarge the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 178-80. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 81. Since article III
was silent on the issue, it was argued that congressional expansion, rather than restriction, of the
Court's original jurisdiction was within Congress' power. Chief Justice Marshall held to the con-
trary, establishing the Court as the final interpreter of the Constitution. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); G. GUNTHER, supra note 57, at 32-35. See also Van
Alstyne,.4 Critical Guide To Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
149. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In this decision, the Court held the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress could not bar slavery in the
territories. The Court reasoned that the act would effect a taking of property, that is, slaves,
without due process of law. Id. at 450. See also infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
150. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249-82 (1977) (court has become
much more like a legislative body enacting its own predilections into law); J. BURNHAM, CON-
GRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 103-123 (1959) (after 1940, judicial vetoes, like the presi-
dential veto, became routine).
151. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
152. Id. at 42. See generally W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885). Woodrow
Wilson believed that "Congress [was] predominant over its so-called coordinate branches....
Congressional government [was] the real government of the Union." Id. at 52-53. A similar posi-
tion was taken by James Burnham, who concluded:
Traditionally the American governmental system has been in fact what it has been
customarily said to be: a changing equilibrium of dispersed, balancing and conflicting
powers. If within that system any one of the diverse elements has traditionally been, on
the whole, of relatively more weight than the others, it is, as the formal scheme of the
Constitution plainly suggests, the legislature, the Congress. If we have had-or have-
any sort of special supremacy, then it has been a congressional supremacy.
J. BURNHAM, supra note 150, at 115.
Prior to the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, many elder states-
men also argued for a strong legislative voice in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson believed that:
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This deferential approach to congressional power of constitutional
explication is not incompatible with the concept of judicial review es-
tablished in Marbury v. Madison.153 Marbury does not preclude an-
other branch of government from having the final authority to interpret
the broad terms of the fourteenth amendment.1 54 Judicial review only
requires the Court to strike down legislation it views as "repugnant to
the [C]onstitution."'15 5 Marbury does not require the Court, in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of a statute, to discredit all congressional inter-
pretations of the fourteenth amendment that differ from those of the
Court. Rather, Marbury only requires the congressional interpretation
to be reasonable in the opinion of the Court. The deferential standard,
[Tie consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions-[is] a
very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of
an oligarchy... .The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to
whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would
become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and cosovereign
within themselves.
Letter to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161
(Ford ed. 1905).
A similar sentiment was espoused by Abraham Lincoln. Following a presidential campaign in
which he advocated a legislative reversal of Dred Scott, see supra note 149, he stated in his first
inaugural address:
[N]or do I deny that such decisions [of the Supreme Court on constitutional law] must be
binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are
also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other de-
partments of the government.... At the same time... if the policy of the Govern-
ment upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to
that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.
6 W. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5, 9-10 (1897).
Senator John Bingham, who later authored and introduced the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, also expressed the view that:
The judiciary are entitled to respect; but if they arrogate powers not conferred upon
them, and attempt by such arrogation of power to take away the legislative power of the
whole people. . . . I claim, as a Representative, the right to disregard such assumed
authority, and, as a citizen and a man, to appeal from such decision to that final arbiter,
the public opinion of the ountry... . [The right to question their propriety, to de-
nounce their injustice, and to insist that whatever is wrong ... be corrected ... is one
of the "powers reserved to the people".
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1839 (1860). See generally Hearings on S. 158, supra note 29,
at 639-729 (testimony of Professor Joseph Witherspoon).
153. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See L. TIBE, supra note 55, at 269-70.
154. Gunther, Judicial Hegemony And Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case And The Im-
peachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 30, 34 (1974).
155. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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therefore, preserves the principle of judicial review under Marbury.'56
After Morgan, the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 157 endorsed
this deferential view of congressional enforcement power. In Jones, the
Court held that Congress had the power to rationally determine what
constituted the "badges and incidents of slavery"'15 under the thir-
teenth amendment.' 59 The Court reasoned that the emancipating pur-
poses of the amendment required a broad construction of the enabling
clause.' 60 It was therefore necessary that Congress have the power to
decide what legislation was appropriate.' 6'
With respect to the Human Life Bill, 162 this traditional view of the
congressional enforcement power 63 legitimates a legislative interpreta-
tion of the word "person," at variance with the Court's interpretation, if
there is a tenable constitutional basis for such a conclusion. 64 The
"traditional" Court would limit its inquiry to the "appropriateness" of
the legislative finding that "all human beings are persons."'' 65  The
156. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 271-72.
157. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
158. Id. at 440. In this case, the Court was called on to determine the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress which provided: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property:' 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
159. Congressional enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment has been equated
with that under the thirteenth amendment. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
160. 392 U.S. at 440. The Court agreed with Senator Trumbull's analysis of the breadth of
congressional enforcement power:.
I have no doubt that under this provision. . . we may destroy all these discriminations
in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment
amounts to nothing. It was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment
was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate legislation,
to carry into effect the article prohibiting slavery. Who is to decide what that appropri-
ate legislation is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to
adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accom-
plish the end.
CONO. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1864).
The Court's rationale seemingly granted Congress expansive authority to interpret the substan-
tive content of the thirteenth amendment. See Note, supra note 107, at 500-05.
161. It is arguable whether the Court is trying to cut back on this expansive interpretation.
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (inferred that right of free association may
limit Congress' power); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (some private discrimination
may be allowed where state does not countenance such action). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
55, at 259-61.
162. See supra note 12.
163. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
165. The Court would pursue this analysis by applying the necessary and proper clause stan-
dard as it did in Morgan. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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Court's examination would address two specific issues. First, should
Congress concern itself with what constitutes a person under the four-
teenth amendment?166 Second, is the determination that all human be-
ings are persons constitutionally justifiable? 167
Congress is authorized to enforce the provisions of the thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.1 68 If Congress is to fulfill practi-
cally its theoretical duty of enforcement, the beneficiaries must be iden-
tified.1 69 Congress is not merely an advisor to the judiciary; 70 it has
the power to determine the scope of those constitutional provisions ca-
pable of expansion.171 If, in the interests of racial equality under the
thirteenth amendment,'72 it is appropriate for Congress to identify the
"incidents and badges of slavery," 173 it would seem equally appropriate
for Congress to determine the class of individuals whose lives are enti-
tled to protection under the fourteenth amendment. 74
The Court held in Roe that, for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
166. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 59-60 and accompa-
nying text.
167. See supra notes 96, 139 & 155-56 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 5; U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2; XV, § 2. Arguably, the enabling clauses
of these amendments empower Congress only to remedy those situations which the Court would
find in violation of the Constitution. See Bickel, supra note 65, at 97; Sager, supra note 99, at
1238; Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REV. 405, 442-43
(1973). This limitation was apparently rejected in Morgan as too confining. See 384 U.S. at 648-
49.
169. Without a focused picture of the scope of protection, it is difficult to enforce the Constitu-
tion's guarantees. The primary issue is which governmental body can define the protected group.
In answer to this question, Professor Ely noted that "personhood" is really not important:
[The argument that fetuses lack constitutional rights is simply irrelevant. For it has
never been held or even asserted that the state interest needed to justify forcing a person
to refrain from an activity, whether or not that activity is consti/utionallyprotected, must
implicate either the life or the constitutional rights of another person. Dogs are not
"persons in the whole sense" nor have they constitutional rights, but that does not mean
the state cannot prohibit killing them: It does not even mean the state cannot prohibit
killing them in the exercise of the First Amendment right of political protest. Come to
think of it, draft cards aren't persons either.
Ely, supra note 9, at 926 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
170. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966). See supra notes 95-96 and accompany-
ing text.
171. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 618-19; supra note 99. See also Sager, supra note 99, at
1239-42 (approves of congressional extension of fourteenth amendment guarantees but believes
Court has already reached outer limits in some areas).
172. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
173. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); see supra notes 157-61 and ac-
companying text.
174. See Galebach, supra note 28, at 20.
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ment, the word "person" does not encompass the unborn. 171 This hold-
ing, however, does not preclude a congressional conclusion to the
contrary. Morgan and Mitchell are illustrative of the Court's willing-
ness to defer to congressional conclusions, especially in "marginal
cases." 176 Although the Court in Lassiter ruled that literacy tests would
not be held unconstitutional without a clear showing of their discrimi-
natory use, 17 7 and that states had the constitutional fight to impose
voter qualification standards implementing such tests, 178 the Morgan
Court upheld congressional legislation proscribing their use. 179  The
Court would deem such legislation constitutional so long as it could
"perceive a basis" on which Congress might have acted.180
Similarly, the findings of the Human Life Bill,' 8 ' if enacted, would
represent a reasonable interpretation of "person" under the fourteenth
amendment, 82 albeit contrary to the Court's ruling in Roe.'83 The ef-
fect of the bill is comparable to that of the act upheld in Morgan :84
both expand the class of persons entitled to fourteenth amendment
rights.'8 5 Furthermore, the bill is no more substantive than the con-
gressional determination 86 of what constituted the "badges and inci-
dents of slavery" in Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co. 187 The Human Life
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). Seesupra notes 5-8 & 119-26 and accompanying
text.
176. Cohen, supra note 64, at 618-19. Professor Cohen notes that Congress is especially well
suited to drawing lines in areas of constitutional ambiguities. Id. at 619. This is especially appro-
priate in the area of the fourteenth amendment, which is "cast... in such sweeping terms that
[its] history does not elucidate [its] contents." L. HAND, supra note 151, at 30. See supra notes
155-56 and accompanying text. See generally Galebach, supra note 28, at 17.
177. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
180. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966). See supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
181. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at § 2 (for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment the word "'person' includes all human beings").
182. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
183. 410 U.S. at 156-57. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
184. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973 4(e) (1976), supra note 85, with REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE
BILL, supra note 12, at §§ I & 2.
185. Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act expanded non-English speaking citizens' right
to vote. Likewise, the Human Life Bill is a positive piece of legislation. Its purpose is to extend
the right to life to the unborn. The fact that it may infringe on a woman's privacy right is only
incidental to this expansion of the right to life. See infra note 231. See also supra note 169.
186. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
187. See upra notes 157-61 & 168-75 and accompanying text.
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Bill provides a similar interpretation of "person" under the protection
of the fourteenth amendment.
B. The Empirical Approach
A second theory has evolved concerning the conflict between judicial
supremacy and congressional enforcement power."' 8 Under this the-
ory, the Court's decisions either are the result of constitutional interpre-
tation, 89 in which case legislative judgments play no role in the judicial
process, or are based on empirical or factfinding efforts.' 90 Legislative
judgments concerning the fourteenth amendment are confined to those
areas in which legislative findings of fact are germane to judicial deter-
minations. 1 ' When the Court's legal conclusion differs on the basis of
the facts presented, 192 the Court will consider, in addition to its own
judgment, congressional judgments to the contrary. 193  This method
188. This theory developed as a response to Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan, 384 U.S. at
659. In his opinion, Justice Harlan claimed that the Court was effectively giving Congress the
authority to define the substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 132-39
and accompanying text. He argued that if Congress' section 5 enforcement power was construed
this broadly, then it was not clear
why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its § 5 "discretion" by enacting
statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.
In all such cases there is room for reasonable men to differ as to whether or not a denial
of equal protection or due process has occurred, and the final decision is one of judg-
ment. Until today this judgment has always been one for the judiciary to resolve.
384 U.S. at 668.
This theory, known as the "fact finding theory," attempts to limit the areas in which congres-
sional decisions will be deferred to by the Court. See Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congres-
sional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the
Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 656, 671 (1976); Sager, supra note 99, at 1239-40.
189. The absolute, or normative, component reaches the essence of the Court's decision. It
concerns the Court's judgment whether or not specific legislation complies with the constitutional
standards created by the Court. For example, the Court's holding that a woman has a right to
privacy under the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), is not subject to
a congressional determination that no such right exists. The interpretive aspect of the Court's
decision is less vulnerable to change, resting on more abstract reasoning than empirical evidence.
Gordon, supra note 188, at 671.
190. The empirical component consists of relevant data gathered, debated, and assessed by the
legislative body. These "legislative facts" are subject to extrinsic change; for example, whether or
not a literacy test has been used in a discriminating fashion. Gordon, supra note 188, at 671. See
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (1979); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 945, 952-59 (1955).
191. See supra notes 188-90.
192. A court's decision is contingent when it is conditioned on a certain set of facts, an altera-
tion of which would potentially lead to a different decision.
193. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See supra note 86; infra
notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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compensates for the limited factual data available to the Court in a
given case 94 and recognizes the legislature's sophisticated factfinding
capabilities. 95 The empirical approach is especially useful in cases in-
volving the deprivation of "liberty" and "due process" where the judi-
cial determination depends on the particular set of facts.196 A court's
decision that rests on constitutional principles exclusive of factual vari-
ables, however, is more "absolute" in nature and beyond the purview
of the legislature. 97
Considered in this light, Marbury's characterization of the Court as
194. Justice Brennan noted that "ithe nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate
forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in consti-
tutional adjudication. . . . Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, how-
ever, have no application to Congress." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Emerson, TowardA General Theory
Of The First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 913 (1963) (factual determinations are both enor-
mously hard and time consuming and unsuitable for judicial process); Reich, Mr. Justice Black
And The Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 740 (1963) (courts have no sources of infor-
mation other than records before them).
195. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Profes-
sor Cox noted:
[Tihe legislature is, or at least can be, a better fact-finding body than an appellate court.
The greater number of members and their varied backgrounds and experience make it
virtually certain that the typical legislature will command wider knowledge and keener
appreciation of current social and economic conditions than will the typical court. The
legislative committee, especially when armed with able counsel and power of subpoena,
is better equipped to develop the relevant data. Courts have always found it hard to
develop the background facts in constitutional cases.
Constitutional Determinations, supra note 118, at 209. See Cox, supra note 27, at 107. See also
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 28 (1976).
196. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (decisions on due
process and equal protection based on empirical foundation, not abstract logic). See Frankfurter,
A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1004-05 (1924). But see Alfange, The Rele-
vance OfLegislative Facts In Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966).
197. When, for example, the Court recognizes a new fundamental right or suspect category,
the degree of deference paid by the Court is greatly reduced. The identification of constitutionally
protected rights, a matter primarily of "constitutional exegesis," would exceed Congress' institu-
tional competence. See Note, supra note 73, at 1286.
Justice Harlan, however, has noted that congressional findings in areas where Congress was
powerless to act by itself, were nevertheless "entitled to the most respectful consideration by the
judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of the government .. " Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
Professor Bork expressed this same view in his testimony concerning the 1972 Busing Proposals:
[Tihe justices may be persuaded to a different view of a subject by the informal opinion
of the legislature. At the very least, a deliberate judgment by Congress on constitutional
matters is a powerful brief before the Court. A constitutional role of even such limited
dimensions is not to be despised.
Washington University Open Scholarship
244 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:219
the final expositer in "declaring the law ''198 is qualified only by the
degree of judicial solicitude toward congressional factual judgments.
The Court's function as the sole interpreter of the Constitution is left
wholly intact.' 99
South Carolina v. Katzenbach2° is an example of judicial deference
to legislative findings of fact. In that case Congress made extensive
factual findings indicating that particular state voting procedures were
being used as a means of discrimination.2 0' On the basis of these find-
ings, the Court approved the congressional conclusion that the use of
literacy tests as prerequisites for voter registration was an unconstitu-
tional infringement upon the citizens' rights of suffrage.2 °2
R. BORK, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS 5-6 (1972), reprinted in
REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 28.
See Gliddrn Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In Glidden, the Court deferred to the congres-
sional judgment that the United States Court of Claims and Courts of Appeals were article III
ratfier than article I courts, id. at 541-42, despite two prior decisions holding to the contrary. See
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
Although Congress could not overturn by fiat constitutional decisions of the Court, 370 U.S. at
541, its interpretations were entitled to due weight. Id. This was especially true where the Court's
decision had motivated Congress to investigate the history involved and, as a result, had drawn a
contrary conclusion. Id. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (great weight ac-
corded congressional decisions despite their implicating fundamental rights).
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
199. Congress is not purporting to overrule a Court's decision. Rather, it is an invitation to
the Court to overrule itself. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at § 5 (bill
invites judicial review). The Court is admittedly not an infallible judicial body. In Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), Justice Brandeis noted that "in cases involving the
Federal Constitution. . .this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to
the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning." Id. at 406-08 (footnotes omitted).
The Court has made mistakes before and, in a number of instances, has corrected them with the
aid of the legislative branch. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). See also
REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 28; Noonan, In Re the Human Life Bill, 7
HUMAN LIFE REV. 65, 72-73 (1981).
200. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
201. See supra note 86.
202. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966). See supra note 86. Two
recent decisions indicate the Court's adoption of this fact-finding approach. In Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the "minority business enter-
prise" provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. In affirming Congress' authority
under the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause to use racial criteria to remedy the discrim-
inatory distribution of federal funds, id. at 476-77, the Court noted the abundant evidence from
which Congress could conclude that discrimination had taken place. Id. at 477-78.
Likewise, in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), the Court approved Congress'
use of its fifteenth amendment enforcement power to prohibit electoral changes which, though not
in violation of the fifteenth amendment, had a discriminatory impact. Id. at 177. The Court once
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Congress similarly exercises its fourteenth amendment enforcement
power in the proposed Human Life Bill.20 3 Just as Congress may deter-
mine that certain voting requirements are used discriminatorily, 204 it
may also decide the empirical question of when human life biologically
originates. By compiling the evidence of experimental research with
the testimony of scientific experts,2 °5 Congress may establish a factual
basis for the objective determination that life begins at conception.20 6
again cited the area's history of purposeful discrimination, from which Congress could conclude
that the changes at issue were intended to be discriminatory. Id.
203. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. Under this theory, Congress is limited to
finding that "the life of each human being begins at conception." REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE
BILL, supra note 12, at § l(a). The decision of whether the word "person includes all human
beings" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, id. at § 2, concerns the substance of the ques-
tion left to the Court. Lewis & Rosenberg, LegalAnalysis of Congress'Authority to Enact a Human
Life Statute, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE 29-30 (1981). See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying
text.
204. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
205. REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 7-13.
206. Recall that "life" refers to the biological existence of a being. See supra note 32. On this
premise, Dr. Hymie Gordon, Professor of Medical Genetics and physician at the Mayo Clinic,
typified the medical testimony before the Senate subcommittee concerning the existence of "life"
before birth.
I think we can now.., say that the question of the beginning life-when Life begins-
is no longer a question for theological or philosophical dispute. It is an established scien-
tificfact. Theologians and philosophers may go on to debate the meaning of life or the
purpose of life, but it is an establishedfact that all life, including human life, begins at
the moment of conception.
Hearings on S, 158, supra note 29, reprinted in REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12,
at 9 (testimony of Dr. Hymie Gordon) (emphasis added).
Dr. Jerome Lejeune, Professor of Fundamental Genetics at the University of Rene Descartes,
Paris, France, reiterated
the fact that after fertilization has taken place a new human has come into being is no
longer a matter of taste or of opinion. The human nature of the human being from
conception to old age is not a metaphysical contention, it is a [matter of]plain experimen-
tal evidence.
Hearings on S. 158, supra note 29, at 10 (testimony of Dr. Jerome Lejeune) (emphasis added). See
also Byrn, supra note 59, at 6-15 (no scientific basis for establishing quickening, viability, birth or
any event other than conception as the beginning of human life).
It has been argued that Congress need only find a possibility of life to protect against its being
taken away. Galebach, supra note 28, at 22-23. Congress, however, need not rely on this interpre-
tation of Morgan, for there is a "consensus," if that is what is required, see supra note 122 and
accompanying text, in the scientific community that life begins at conception.
There are potentially conflicting definitions of "conception." From the subcommittee report, it
appears that Congress views the fusion of the ovum (female gamete) and spermatozoon (male
gamete) at fertilization as the correct scientific definition. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE
BILL, supra note 12, at 7-9. See generally J. Baker, The Hatch Amendment: A Legal Analysis
(1981) (unpublished manuscript); Letter from Henry J. Hyde to the Editors of the Washington
Post (May 27, 1981), reprinted in 7 HUMAN LIFE REV. 80 (1981).
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Such a finding, in the words of Justice Harlan, is entitled to the "most
respectful consideration" by the Court.20 7
IV. A PROPOSED VALUE JUDGMENT
Assuming that human life begins at conception, the Court will have
to decide whether every human being is entitled to fourteenth amend-
ment protection.208 In deciding the extent to which the fourteenth
amendment protects the unborn, the Court must make a value judg-
ment concerning the intrinsic worth of human life.20 9 Two standards
exist for evaluating "personhood" under the fourteenth amendment.
The first is more absolute and is often referred to as the "sanctity of life
ethic," 2 10 while the second is a more relativistic "quality of life
ethic."2 1 '
Under the "sanctity of life ethic," the judicial standard for "per-
sonhood" has three components: viability, humanity, and the posses-
sion of being.212 Once life is established, an individual is endowed with
207. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). See supra note 197.
208. See supra note 203. How the Court will resolve this issue is unpredictable. What the
Court would hold on the basis of the Constitution, what it would hold on the basis of case prece-
dent, and what it would hold on the basis of the facts at issue may not necessarily coincide.
Hearings on S. 158, supra note 29, at 312 (testimony of Professor Robert H. Bork).
209. Once the scientific question of when human life begins is resolved, the next issue is
whether that life in its early stages should be accorded the same protection given postnatal life.
Recognizing "that it is a constitution we are expounding," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original), which may "draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1957) (referring to what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth
amendment), the Court will have to "supplement the declaration and fill the vacant spaces, by the
same processes and methods that have built up the customary law." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921). See generally Wolf, supra note 140. Thus, the Court is left
with a value judgment in deciding whether a fetus has a right to life as defined under the four-
teenth amendment. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 13-18.
Not everyone believes that value judgments should be left to the Court's discretion. Professor
Cox, for one, suggested that although
[t]heoreticaly, the Court can set outer limits to what the legislature can "reasonably"
conclude, . . . where the variety of acceptable justifications is great and the ultimate
balance depends as much upon the facts and their characterization as upon ultimate
values, the theoretical check has little practical meaning and, if the Court is faithful to
the formula, any constitutional limit virtually disappears.
Constitutional Determinations, supra note 118, at 211. See Note, supra note 73, at 1284.
210. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
212. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court articulated the test for "personhood"
as follows: "They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly 'persons' within the
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certain inalienable rights,21 3 among them the right to the continuance
of life.214
Under the "quality of life ethic," the standard for personal existence
is imprecise and variable. "Personhood" is subjective, subordinate to
fluctuating extrinsic factors surrounding an individual's conception.
Commentators and court justices have suggested that the mother's
health 215 and financial situation,' as well as the fetus' physical devel-
opment217 and educational opportunities, 218 are relevant factors in de-
termining the "meaningfulness" and correlative value of the fetus'
existence.
Judicial precedent,21 9 the events surrounding the drafting of the four-
teenth amendment,22 ° and the intent of its framers22" ' favor the adop-
tion of the "sanctity of life ethic." Ratification of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868 occurred in response to the controversial Dred
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 70 (footnotes
omitted). The Court noted in one case that it is immaterial to a discussion of fundamental human
rights that Levy dealt with illegitimate children who were already born. See Glona v. American
Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). "To say that the test of Equal Protection should be the 'legal'
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause
necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal' lines as it chooses." Id. at 75-76. See
also Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Needfor a Ltfe-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF.
L. REV. 1250, 1291 n.216 (1975).
213. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See generally Corwin, The "Higher
Lan," Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 144 (1928).
214. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 13-18.
215. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1972).
216. In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), the Court found that Title XIX of the Social Security
Act did not require the funding of nontherapeutic abortions. 432 U.S. at 447. Justice Marshall
filed a trenchant dissenting opinion in which he stated that "[i]f funds for an abortion are unavail-
able, a poor woman. . . may well give up all chance of escaping the cycle of poverty .... [S]he
will be unable to work so that her family can break out of the welfare system or the lowest income
brackets." Id. at 458.
217. The development of intrauterine diagnosis of hereditary disease or congenital defect in
the fetus, in conjunction with the availability of abortion, has provided what many view as "an
acceptable, albeit imperfect, alternative in the prevention of such conditions for many families."
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS: REPORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE 1-31 (National Institute of Health Pub. No. 70-1973, 1979).
218. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The lack of available
money to fund abortions perpetuates the existence of "unwanted minority and mixed-race chil-
dren [who] now spend blighted lives in foster homes, orphanages, and 'reform' schools." Id. at
456.
219. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
221. See infra note 227.
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Scott case.222 In that decision the Court refused to recognize the equal-
ity of blacks under the Declaration of Independence.22 3 Although the
plain language of the declaration, that "all men are created equal," ap-
peared to encompass "the whole human family,"224 the Court found
that blacks were not intended to be included.225 Consequently, the
222. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
223. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,409-10 (1857). The Court recognized the values
and purposes behind the Declaration of Independence as a means of discovering the framers'
intent in delimiting the rights of blacks under the Constitution.
224. Id. at 410.
225. Id. The Court discussed the laws against mixed marriages enforced at the time of the
American Revolution. These laws were intended to create an impenetrable barrier between the
white and black races. On this basis, the Court concluded:
[I]t is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were (sic) not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for
if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been ut-
terly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sym-
pathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
received universal rebuke and reprobation.
Id.
Not all the justices agreed with the Court's reasoning. Justice McLean advocated looking be-
yond the practices at the time of the Constitution's framing and to the ideals embodied therein.
He wrote:
I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the Constitu-
tion in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period, into a traffic [i.e. the slave
trade] which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian nations.
I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground. Our
independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while I admit the Gov-
ernment was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of
the New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was
adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would
greatly ameliorate their condition.
Many of the States, on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterward, took
measures to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; and it is a well-known
fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as well as North, that the
institution of slavery would gradually decline, until it became extinct.
Id. at 537-38 (McLean, J., dissenting). See Hearings On S. 158, supra note 29, at 480-82 (testi-
mony of Professor Victor G. Rosenblum).
At the time of the fourteenth amendment's passage, a strong and successful movement was
afoot to protect human beings from the moment of conception. An American Medical Associa-
tion resolution adopted in 1859 typified the sentiment at the time, "protesting 'against such unwar-
rantable destruction of human life,' calling upon state legislatures to revise their abortion laws,
and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies 'in pressing the subject."' Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 142 (1973) (quoting 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. MED. ASS'N 28, 78 (1959)).
As a result of this movement, at least 28 of 37 states criminalized abortions prior to quickening
at the time of the amendment's ratification. Byrn, supra note 59, at 836. See generally J. NOONAN,
THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1970); Sauer, Attitudes to
Abortion in America, 1800-1973, in 28 POPULATION STUD. 53 (1974). It has been suggested that
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black man was "not a person but a thing" in the eye of the law.226
The fourteenth amendment, however, was intended to protect the
fundamental rights of all human beings, particularly the "weak and the
helpless. '227 The spirit of the amendment comports with Justice Bren-
nan's conclusion that American society "strongly affirms the sanctity of
life 228 and that the "dignity of the individual is the supreme value."22 9
In fact, to preclude a depreciation of the right to life, the Court has
liberally construed those clauses associated with the security of the per-
son.230  Whether the Court will prove equally attentive in protecting
the lives of the unborn is unsettled.23'
when the state legislatures ratified the fourteenth amendment on the basis that "all men are cre-
ated equal," they were acting on the same principles which motivated the passing of laws to pro-
tect the unborn. See REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at 26; Byrn, supra note
59, at 835-39.
226. Bailey v. Poindexter, 55 Va. 132, 142-43 (1858) (citing Dred Scott as support).
227. In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (Black, J., dissent-
ing), Justice Black, questioned the extension of personhood to corporations, see Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), and pointed out that "Ithe history of the
Amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless
human beings. ... 303 U.S. at 87.
A brief consideration of the legislative history surrounding the fourteenth amendment supports
Justice Black's observation. Congressman Bingham, who drafted section 1 of the amendment,
believed that "any human being," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866), was "entitled
to protection of American law." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1867). Senator How-
ard, who introduced the amendment in the Senate, asserted that it applied to "common humanity
. . . giv[ing] to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the
same protection before the law as it gives the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most
haughty." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2766 (1866). See generally Corwin, supra note 213.
228. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 296. In recognition of this principle, at least one court, prior to Roe, upheld its
state's antiabortion statute. See Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Mo. 1972).
230. The Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) stated that "constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as
it consisted more in sound than in substance." Id. at 635.
231. One caveat to any analysis involving Morgan concerns Justice Brennan's well known
"Ratchet Theory." 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. Succinctly stated, congressional legislation designed to
secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment may not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" equal
protection and due process rights previously recognized by the Court. Although the Court has
never invoked this theory, some have argued that it precludes the enactment of the Human Life
Bill because the Bill would infringe a woman's right to privacy. See Lewis & Rosenberg, supra
note 203, at 30. On the other hand, whatever entitlement Congress has to authorize an expansion
of fourteenth amendment rights should support a restriction as well. If the relative competence of
Congress to make factual findings is the justification for judicial deference to congressional expan-
sion of rights, logical consistency requires similar deference where those rights are restricted. Con-
stitutional Determinations, supra note 118, at 255. See Cox, supra note 27, at 106-07; Note, supra
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note 107, at 500-05; Developments: Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 885, 898-903 (1973).
Professor Cohen advanced a more significant objection. Whenever there is an expansion of a
right, there is necessarily a contraction of another's right. Cohen, supra note 64, at 607-13. There
are numerous possibilities for conflicts of this type. See generally Note, supra note 73, at 1289
n.155. For example, a statute permitting public demonstrations on private property would argua-
bly dilute the property owner's fourteenth amendment property rights. See Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980) (state's interest in expanding rights of free speech
beyond that of federal Constitution did not work a denial of property without due process of law).
A modified ratchet theory, suggested by Professor Tribe, would limit congressional power to
restrict those interests protected by other sections of the Constitution, for example, the Bill of
Rights. See L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 272. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 287 (1970)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (congressional regulation of interstate com-
merce may not impinge on Bill of Rights). This analysis, however, would appear to restrict the
congressional enforcement power unnecessarily. Often, protected rights are antagonistic to one
another, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (defendant's right to a fair trial in
opposition to the press' right to publicize), and necessitate a balancing process between the com-
peting interests. To prevent Congress from participating in such a decisionmaking process may
result not only in the exclusion of worthy analysis, cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (congressional views "entitled to most re-
spectful consideration"), but also may result in the disqualification of the more competent branch
of government. See Note, supra note 73, at 1287-91. See also Henkin, Infallibility Under Law:
Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1022 (1978).
Another explanation of the ratchet theory suggests that Congress may vary the remedy avail-
able for infringement of an individual's rights but may not alter the right itself. See Burt, supra
note 65, at 127-31; Monaghan, supra note 99, at 26-30. It has been aptly noted, however, that the
substance of a right is closely associated with its remedy, the reduction of which may abrogate the
right altogether. See Note, supra note 73, at 1277.
Possibly the most workable analysis of the ratchet theory focuses on the fundamental purpose of
a statute. Where the expansion of a right is the clear intent of the act and the dilution of other
rights is only incidental to the act's implementation, the congressional judgment should prevail.
Hearings on S. 158, supra note 29, at 354 (testimony of Professor Basile J. Uddo). This analysis
could resolve the problems surrounding the ratchet theory. Brennan's example of an impermissi-
ble exercise of the congressional enforcement power authorizing states to establish racially segre-
gated schools, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), would be invalid since its
obvious purpose would be discrimination.
Applying this latter explanation of the ratchet theory to the Human Life Bill, the focus of the
analysis should be on the intent of the Congress and the primary effect of the statute; in this case,
the expansion of the class of person afforded protection under the fourteenth amendment. When
the fundamental decision hinges on a value judgment based on a "quality of life ethic," see supra
notes 215-18 and accompanying text, the judgment arguably is more a policy choice for Congress
than a question of law for the Court. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977). Where a
"decision . . . is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply
divided . . . the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We
should not forget that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as the courts."' Id. (quoting Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S.
267, 270 (1904)). See also Ely, supra note 9, at 923-26. See generally Mashaw, supra note 195.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/5
Number 1] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HUMAN LIFE BILL
CONCLUSION
The right to life is a fundamental human right,232 well established in
American society.233 The Supreme Court in Roe, however, classified
one group of individuals as nonpersons 234 without determining whether
its decision failed to protect human life. 5 The Court intimated that its
own institutional restrictions might forever preclude judicial determi-
nation of when life begins. 6 The Human Life Bill affords Congress
the opportunity to resolve this question.237 Although Congress' conclu-
sion may be at variance with the Court's,2 38 the Bill may nevertheless
be effective. The Court's opinion can be challenged on the basis of
constitutional misinterpretation.3 9 A judicial decision derives its va-
lidity from the rigor of its reasoning." When the public becomes en-
lightened by a more humane justice, the Constitution may acquire a
deeper meaning,241 and the Court will bow to the force of congressional
judgment. 42 The Human Life Bill suggests an alternative reading of
232. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776); supra notes 222-30 and accom-
panying text.
233. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
234. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973).
235. See id. at 159; supra notes 5-7 & 119-26 and accompanying text.
236. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
237. See supra notes 162-87 & 203-08 and accompanying text.
238. Compare supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text with REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE
BILL, supra note 12, at §§ 1, 2.
239. Chief Justice Taney, who was later to author the Dred Scott opinion, see supra notes 222-
26 and accompanying text, recognized that the Court is not an infallible body; rather, it is "the law
of [the] [Ciourt that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discus-
sion when it is supposed to have been founded on error, and that its judicial authority should
hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported." Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting). See Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 541 (1962); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Hearings on S. 158, supra note 29, at 319-27 (testimony of Professor Robert F. Nagel);
supra notes 197 & 199.
240. See supra note 239.
241. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (Court specifically addressed what
constituted cruel and *unusual punishment under eighth and fourteenth amendments). See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (society's rejection of se-
vere punishment indicates it does not comport with human dignity). If society's opinion is of any
worth in interpreting the Constitution, and it is questionable whether it is, see supra note 122, it
may be of interest that one public opinion poll found 75% of the public opposed to the availability
of abortion on demand. Gallup Poll- Attitudes on Abortion, The Times-Picayune/The States-Item,
Aug. 28, 1980, § 3, at 3, col. 1. f. J. NOONAN, supra note 125, at 69-79 (criticizes blatant proabor-
tion bias of news media and pollsters).
242. See supra note 239.
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the fourteenth amendment.243 Whether the Court will adopt such an
interpretation is unclear.2' What is clear, however, is that such a bill is
within the ambit of congressional authority to secure the right to life,245
"the first and only legitimate object of good government. 246
Benjamin A. Ruf
243. The Human Life Bill proposes an alternative to the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that
the fetus is not a "person" under the fourteenth amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-
58 (1973). See also supra notes 5-8 & 119-26 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
245. At least the determination that human life begins at conception is within the congres-
sional enforcement power, see supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text, if not the decision that
every human being is a person for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 162-87
and accompanying text.
246. Address by Thomas Jefferson (March 31, 1809), reprinted in J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONs 472-73 (14th ed. 1968), citedin REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL, supra note 12, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/5
